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We examine the impact of the Split Share Structure Reform on the well-known foreign 
share discount puzzle in China. Existing literature confirms that foreign investors are more 
concerned about insider expropriation because of their information disadvantage relative 
to domestic investors. The split share structure of the ownership of Chinese listed firms 
created a conflict of interests between state and private shareholders. Since, before the 
reform, state shareholders held restricted shares that denied them any wealth effect from 
share price movements, they had a limited incentive to work with private shareholders to 
ensure that managers maximized the stock market value of the firm. By abolishing the 
trading restrictions for state shareholders, this reform has increased the incentive 
alignment between state and private shareholders, encouraging them to monitor managers. 
If foreign investors’ concerns over the corporate governance implications of the split share 
structure at least partly contributed to their discounting of Chinese listed firms, then this 
discount should be reduced following the reform. Indeed, our evidence confirms this 
prediction, especially among Chinese listed firms with more state ownership or restricted 
shares. Our findings imply that this significant institutional reform of the Chinese stock 
market has benefitted minority investors. 
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1. Introduction 
We study the impact of the Split Share Structure Reform (e.g., Firth et al., 2010) on the 
well-known foreign share discount puzzle in China (e.g., Bailey et al., 1999). Previous studies 
have attributed this discount to a wide array of reasons, ranging from market illiquidity (Chen et 
al., 2001) to information asymmetry (e.g., Chan et al., 2008). We add to the literature on the 
Chinese foreign share discount by examining a unique research setting based on the effect of an 
exogenous regulatory change. The existing literature suggests that foreign investors are more 
concerned about the scope of expropriation by controlling insiders (e.g., Leuz et al., 2009), 
because foreigners have less local knowledge with which to detect such activities, than 
domestic investors. Prior to the Split Share Structure Reform, state shareholders held restricted 
shares that insulated them from the stock market performance of their firms, and therefore 
encouraged them to collude with managers and pursue self-serving activities at the expense of 
private investors. If the fear of insider expropriation under this split share structure at least 
partly contributed to the foreign share discount phenomenon in China, then we would expect 
the reforms to have alleviated this discount. Our study not only gains new insights into the 
underlying cause of the foreign share discount but also provides an empirical verification of the 
benefit of the Split Share Structure Reform, which is considered to be one of the most 
significant institutional changes in the Chinese stock market. Since China is an increasingly 
influential emerging country, the effect of its capital market reforms has policy implications for 
other transitional economies.  
As a result of China’s political ideology and transitional economy, the government maintains 
a high degree of ownership through state-affiliated shareholders in the majority of listed firms, 
to sustain its influence (e.g., Allen et al., 2005). The existing literature stipulates two 
counteracting effects of ownership concentration on corporate governance (e.g., La Porta et al., 
1999; Claessens et al., 2002). First, large shareholders can lead to an entrenchment effect (e.g., 
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Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Johnson et al., 2000; Djankov et al., 2008), which could impede 
corporate governance since their dominance over the control of the firm enables them to collude 
with management to expropriate the wealth of minority outside investors. Second, large 
shareholders can also be associated with an incentive alignment effect (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Gomes, 2000), which could enhance corporate governance if their interests and wealth 
are associated with the value of the firm they control. In the case of state shareholders in China, 
however, control and ownership concentration was maintained primarily through restricted 
shares, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform. Since these shares could not be traded in the 
stock exchange, the state shareholders were more interested in acquiring political credits or 
cash dividends. However, these pursuits may not necessarily be beneficial to their firms’ market 
value and long-term growth, upon which private investors’ wealth hinges. In other words, the 
split share structure of ownership in Chinese listed firms generated a conflict of interest 
between state and private shareholders. This tilted state shareholders toward the 
aforementioned entrenchment effect instead of the incentive alignment effect. By abolishing 
the split share structure, the state shareholders will benefit from increases in firms’ market value, 
just as the private investors do. Thus, the Split Share Structure Reform should create a greater 
desire among state shareholders to monitor executives and ensure they maximize their firms’ 
market value. This should foster the incentive alignment effect and ultimately benefit private 
investors. 
The preference of foreign investors for well-governed firms is well-established in the 
literature. In a survey of global investors, McKinsey and Company (2002) show that corporate 
governance considerations dominate investment decisions, and over 60% of respondents state 
that they will avoid poorly governed firms. Leuz et al. (2009) show that foreigners do indeed 
invest less in poorly governed firms in countries with weak legal institutions. They suggest that 
poorly governed firms require more monitoring, which makes them more costly for foreign 
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investors, who lack local knowledge to detect expropriation activities. They also argue that 
countries with weak legal institutions further increase the disadvantage for foreign investors, 
since insider relationships are more influential in controlling the firms. Due to the information 
disadvantage, foreign investors are also expected to benefit more from institutional reforms that 
reduce the scope of insiders’ wealth expropriation from outsiders. For instance, Tan et al. (2011) 
show that there are greater increases in following and forecast accuracy among foreign analysts 
than local analysts after firms improve their corporate information environment. As a result of 
China’s weak shareholder protection (e.g., Allen et al., 2005) and foreigners’ lack of local 
knowledge, the entrenchment effect of state shareholders, encouraged by the split share 
structure, is expected to put off foreign investors more than domestic investors. An increase in 
the incentive alignment effect of state shareholders, promoted by the reform aimed at 
abolishing the split share structure, is expected be more beneficial to foreign investors than 
domestic investors. 
The foreign share discount phenomenon in China has been well-documented in the literature 
(e.g., Chakravarty et al., 1998; Bailey et al., 1999; Fernald and Rogers, 2002). Although China 
is not the only country with segmented stock markets, its foreign shares are widely traded at a 
discount (Bailey et al., 1999). This unique phenomenon is considered to be a puzzle generally, 
because foreign investors are assumed to be more able to diversify their risk and should 
therefore demand lower returns than domestic investors, which in turn should lead to a foreign 
share premium instead of a discount. Several explanations have been put forward in the 
literature to explain the unique Chinese foreign share discount. These include B-share market 
illiquidity (Chen et al., 2001), limited domestic investment opportunities (Fernald and Rogers, 
2002), information asymmetry (Chan et al., 2008), domestic investor speculation (Mei et al., 
2009), and firms’ governance qualities (Tong and Yu, 2011).   
However, to what extent the split share structure and its subsequent reform have influenced 
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the foreign share discount in China, beyond the existing explanations provided by the literature, 
has not been examined. Some factors, such as liquidity, information asymmetry, speculation 
and governance characteristics, that are suggested by previous studies, can all be endogenously 
related to the foreign share discount. In contrast, the Split Share Structure Reform provides a 
unique research setting for us to empirically observe whether an exogenously-induced 
reduction in the conflict of interests between dominant and minority shareholders could 
alleviate foreign investors’ concerns over insider expropriation. In fact, some of the existing 
explanations provided by the literature on Chinese foreign share discounts, such as liquidity, 
information asymmetry and governance qualities, may in fact be manifestations of the deeper 
underlying conflict between shareholder groups that we can observe by studying the effects of 
this reform. Firms with insiders who are more likely to pursue self-serving activities under the 
split share structure are also more likely to have higher information asymmetry, since the 
insiders have greater incentives to withhold sensitive information. Such firms are also less 
likely to attract foreign investors, which in turn decreases their market liquidity. To cover up 
insider expropriation, such firms are also more likely to reduce levels of governance, for 
example by appointing a less independent board. Of course, we do not stipulate that the Split 
Share Structure Reform will completely eliminate the foreign share discount. This is because 
other institutional factors, such as the lack of alternative investment channels for domestic 
investors, which also contribute to the phenomenon (Fernald and Rogers, 2002), persist. Our 
specific prediction is that the split share structure contributed significantly to the foreign share 
discount on Chinese listed firms under state control or with more restricted shares.  
To carry out our analyses, we sample all A- and B-share dual-listed Chinese firms in both the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the period from 2001 to 2008. For each firm, we 
identify the year in which the negotiations over compensation to holders of tradable shares were 
completed and the process of reform began. We classify firms that are controlled by state 
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shareholders, or have above the yearly cross-sectional median proportion of restricted shares, as 
our treatment group, since we assume that such firms are more sensitive to the influence of the 
Split Share Structure Reform. We classify firms that are controlled by private shareholders, or 
have below the yearly cross-sectional median proportion of restricted shares, as our control 
group, since we assume that such firms are less sensitive to the reform. To draw the inference 
that the foreign share discount has indeed been reduced by the reform, instead of some other 
unidentified background reasons, such as a time trend or macro-economic factors, we must 
observe a significantly more pronounced reduction in the treatment than in the control group, 
after the reform.   
Our findings are as follows. Among firms under state control or with a higher proportion of 
restricted shares (i.e., our treatment group), we observe a significantly higher foreign share 
discount than among their counterparts, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform. This 
confirms our conjecture that foreign investors are concerned about the corporate governance of 
Chinese state-controlled listed firms and incorporate this into the discount rate they attach to 
Chinese listed firms. One can interpret this pre-reform finding as an inverse relationship 
between corporate governance and the foreign share discount, which is broadly in line with 
Tong and Yu (2011), although their analyses are based on an earlier sample period of 1998 to 
2005 and they do not look at state control or restricted shares. Following the reform, we find 
original evidence of a significantly more pronounced reduction in the foreign share discount 
among firms in our treatment group, relative to those in our control group. Evidence of a greater 
effect among Chinese listed firms that are sensitive to the reform confirms our prediction that 
an exogenous reduction in the conflict of interests between the dominant state shareholder and 
the minority private shareholders after the reform reduces the foreign share discount. This is 
consistent with the reduction of the scope of insider expropriation benefiting foreign investors 
more as a result of their limited local knowledge relative to domestic investors. Our findings are 
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robust to several dimensions of controls, such as determinants of the Chinese foreign share 
discount that have been identified in the literature (i.e., market liquidity, information asymmetry, 
investor speculation and governance qualities), determinants of investors required returns (i.e., 
size, leverage, growth, profitability and risk), as well as firm, industry, year and regional fixed 
effects.  
Our findings contribute to several strands of the academic literature. In relation to the 
growing literature on economic development in China, we show that the Split Share Structure 
Reform has had a beneficial impact on the capital market of this transitional economy. Evidence 
of a reduction in the required rate of return demanded by foreign investors since the reform 
suggests a decline in the risk perceived by outside investors. This in turn decreases the firms’ 
cost of raising equity capital. In terms of the literature on corporate governance, we provide an 
example of how the conflict of interests between dominant and minority shareholders can be 
reduced exogenously through regulatory intervention. In a transitional economy where 
shareholder protection and legal enforcement are weak, the influence of outside investors may 
not be enough to motivate firms to improve corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, 
public policy may be required to stimulate change. Finally, we add to the established literature 
on the Chinese foreign share discount puzzle an alternative explanatory factor, that is, the 
concern over the state control of listed firms under the split share structure. Our findings 
confirm that foreign investors are more concerned about this issue than domestic investors. 
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, explains the institutional 
background and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and methodologies. 
Section 4 presents our empirical findings. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature and hypotheses 
2.1 The Chinese stock market 
China established the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in the early 1990s to promote 
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economic development by encouraging firms to obtain external funding. China’s stock market 
has experienced significant growth in parallel with its economy. For instance, the market 
capitalization of China’s stock market was already the largest among developing countries by 
2001, and it is currently the second largest in the world, with only the United States’ stock 
market larger.
1
 The success and experience of Chinese economic growth has useful 
implications for other emerging countries. Thus, there is increasing interest in the academic 
literature in examining the development of the Chinese economy and capital market. 
Chinese listed firms issue A-shares, B-shares and H-shares to different constituencies. The 
vast majority of Chinese listed firms only issue A-shares, which are traded in Shanghai or 
Shenzhen exchanges in the Chinese currency RMB. A-shares could initially only be purchased 
by domestic investors. Since 2003, some qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) have 
also been granted access. However, the A-share market is currently still largely dominated by 
Chinese domestic investors. B-shares are traded in either U.S. dollars in the Shanghai 
exchanges or Hong Kong dollars in the Shenzhen exchanges. Initially, B-shares could only be 
traded by foreign investors. Since 2001, domestic investors have also been allowed to purchase 
B-shares, but only if they have access to foreign currency, which are subject to exchange 
control in China. Therefore, the B-share market is still largely dominated by foreign investors. 
H-shares are not traded in mainland China’s stock exchanges but in Hong Kong, which has a 
different institutional environment. Chinese listed firms that issue A-shares mainly to domestic 
investors can also issue B-shares and/or H-shares that mainly target foreign investors.  
By the end of 2009, 1,632 Chinese listed firms had issued pure A-shares that were traded on 
the mainland Chinese stock exchanges. Among them, 86 had also issued B-shares. These A- 
and B-share dual-listed firms are required to report under different accounting standards to 
cater for investors’ needs. Firms that issue A-shares are required to comply with Chinese 
domestic accounting standards, which converged to the International Financial Reporting 
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Standards (IFRS) in 2007. However, even before 2007, firms that had issued both A- and 
B-shares were required to report under both the Chinese domestic accounting standards and the 
IFRS. Therefore, these A- and B-share dual-listed firms should not have been affected by the 
impact of the IFRS transition in the same way as the purely A-share-issuing firms. Although the 
A- and B-share dual-listed firms only account for a subset of all listed firms in China, they 
provide a useful setting to evaluate the differential impact of firm characteristics and 
institutional reforms on foreign investors. 
2.2 The Chinese foreign share discount puzzle 
Bailey et al. (1999) document that foreign shares are priced at a discount only in China and at 
a premium in all other segmented markets, namely, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Norway, the Philippines, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Thailand. It should be noted that 
China was not the only emerging economy in their study, which makes the phenomenon 
interesting, and as a result it has become known in the literature as a puzzle. There are 
competing explanations for the general behavior of foreign investors. Some studies (e.g., Froot 
and Ramadorai, 2007) suggest that foreign investors have an advantage over domestic investors 
due to their experience and expertise. Foreign investors are also assumed to be better able to 
diversify their risk than domestic investors. These arguments imply that foreign investors will 
require lower returns, which seems to apply to all countries except for China in the study by 
Bailey et al. (1999). Other studies (e.g., Brennan and Cao, 1997; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001) 
argue that foreign investors have informational, linguistic, and cultural disadvantages. These 
qualities imply that foreign investors will require higher returns, which seems to apply to China 
but not to other countries. 
More direct explanations relating to the Chinese setting have been put forward to address the 
foreign share discount puzzle. Fernald and Rogers (2002) suggest that Chinese investors have 
lower expected returns due to the lack of alternative investment channels. Apart from shares, 
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their primary investment outlet is bank deposits, which pay less than the international level of 
interest rates. Although this argument explains why A-shares would be traded at a premium 
relative to B-shares, it does not address cross-sectional variations in this premium across firms. 
Chakravarty et al. (1998) and Chan et al. (2008) document that information asymmetry between 
domestic and foreign investors explains a portion of the cross-sectional variation in the Chinese 
foreign share discount. This is consistent with the suggestion of Merton (1987) that investors 
are more reluctant to hold stocks associated with poorer information environments. Chen et al. 
(2001) suggest the trading activity explanation, which stipulates that the discount is due to 
lower liquidity in the B-share market. This is in line with the argument of Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) that investors require higher returns to compensate for the higher trading 
costs associated with illiquid stocks, and therefore attach a higher discount rate to them. Mei et 
al. (2009) argue that domestic investors’ speculation contributes to the cross-sectional variation 
in the A-share premium. This is based on the theoretical model of Scheinkman and Xiong 
(2003), which suggests there is a speculative component in asset pricing. Tong and Yu (2011) 
argue that the B-share discount is higher among firms with weaker governance qualities, such 
as a less independent board. This is broadly consistent with the analyses of Bai et al. (2004), 
which show that corporate governance measures impact the Tobin’s Q of Chinese firms. 
The discounting of Chinese listed firms by foreign investors also provides a useful platform 
on which to evaluate the economic consequences of this unprecedented institutional reform in 
China. It provides an empirically observable measure of the discount rate to overcome the 
widely recognized inaccuracy of estimates based on asset pricing (e.g., Fama and French, 1997; 
Elton, 1999) and valuation (e.g., Easton and Monahan, 2005) models. 
2.3 The ownership structure in China 
Ownership structure literature stipulates that it is possible for large shareholders to play a 
positive role in corporate governance, since through their power and expertise they can reduce 
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the agency problem more effectively than minority shareholders (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Admati et al., 1994; Maug, 1998; La Porta et al., 1999; Noe, 
2002). An incentive alignment effect occurs when large shareholders incur a greater cost from a 
decline in their firm’s value than they could gain from diverting their firm’s cash flow into their 
own pockets. Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) show there is 
increased management turnover in the presence of large shareholders. Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) find tighter executive compensation 
controls under large shareholders. Gomes (2000) suggests that a high degree of ownership 
concentration also serves as a signal for reputation-building by controlling owners. To the 
extent that large shareholders can improve corporate governance and decrease agency costs, 
they are also expected to influence firm valuation by reducing the firm’s cost of capital. 
Lombardo and Pagano (2002) suggest that investors require higher returns to compensate for 
the monitoring costs of poorly governed firms. Corporate governance also decreases the cost of 
capital by discouraging insider trading (e.g., Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2003). Better 
governance can also reduce the non-diversifiable risk of expropriation by corporate insiders 
during market downturns (e.g., Durnev and Kim, 2005).  
Chinese listed firms have a high degree of state ownership concentration. This originates 
from the early 1990s, when many state-owned Chinese firms became partially privatized and 
were listed on the stock exchanges. Unlike in western, developed economies, the large 
shareholders of listed firms in China represent the interests of the state instead of private 
investor interests. Both central and local governments in China usually retain a substantial 
amount of ownership so as to maintain effective control of these listed firms. In contrast, other 
transitional economies such as Russia largely relinquish state ownership once firms are 
privatized. The majority of the firms currently listed on the Chinese stock exchanges are still 
dominated by state ownership. However, instead of delivering the aforementioned corporate 
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governance benefits of large shareholders, the high degree of state ownership in Chinese listed 
firms is more likely to exacerbate the agency problem from the perspective of minority private 
shareholders. In Chinese state-controlled listed firms, both the managers and the dominant 
shareholders are affiliated with the government, and share the same interest in pursuing 
political credits and other common agenda. This creates the incentive and the opportunities for 
dominant shareholders to collude with managers so as to divert firm resources to serve their 
own objectives at the expense of minority shareholders.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that an entrenchment effect occurs when large 
shareholders with effective control of a firm’s management have the incentive to pursue their 
own interests against those of the other investors. Johnson et al. (2000) provide evidence of 
“tunneling”, where controlling shareholders transfer assets and profits out of the firm for their 
own benefit, in civil-law countries such as Belgium, France and Italy. Claessens et al. (2002) 
show that firm value drops when the control rights of large shareholders exceed their cash-flow 
rights, in eight East Asian countries. In the case of China, existing studies provide evidence that 
controlling shareholders use inter-corporate loans (Jiang et al., 2010) and cash dividends (Lv et 
al., 2011) to engage in tunneling and the expropriation of minority shareholders. Wei and Xiao 
(2009) document that state shareholders prefer cash dividends to share dividends and argue that 
this has negative implications for their firms’ long-term growth and value. Yuan et al. (2007) 
and Gul et al. (2010) both document reduced corporate transparency among Chinese listed 
firms with greater state ownership, which is consistent with entrenched dominant shareholders 
withholding value-relevant information to conceal self-serving behavior. Firth et al. (2006) 
show that executive remuneration is only sensitive to share return performance in 
privately-controlled Chinese listed firms. 
The entrenchment effect of state shareholder in China is exacerbated by the institutional 
environment, such as the use of restricted shares to maintain such ownership. Therefore, the 
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Split Share Structure Reform provides a useful opportunity to evaluate how state ownership 
affects the valuation of Chinese listed firms. 
2.4 The Split Share Structure Reform in China 
Under the split share structure, the shares of Chinese listed firms were classified into 
restricted and freely-traded shares. There were two kinds of restricted shares: state and 
legal-person shares. The former were held by central and local governments through their 
bureaucratic agencies or affiliated state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The latter could be held by 
any of the above, or by private entities. Restricted shares could not be freely traded in the stock 
exchanges and could only be transferred in two ways. First, they could be transferred with the 
authorities’ approval, in which case the transfer price was often set near the book value. Second, 
they could be auctioned, also with a substantial illiquidity discount on their value. The 
documented illiquidity discounts, due to the lack of tradability, are nearly 80% in Chen and 
Xiong (2001), Chen et al. (2008), Huang and Xu (2009), and Hou and Howell, (2011). Even 
after the transfer or auction, these shares would remain restricted and could not be traded in the 
stock exchanges. The split share structure essentially catered for the socio-political ideology of 
China. On the one hand, the government wished to maintain its influence in listed firms, in 
order to achieve political and social objectives. On the other hand, it also wanted their 
controlled firms to reduce their dependence on state subsidies and increase their ability to raise 
capital through the equity market. Nevertheless, this split share structure reduced the quality of 
firms’ corporate governance and the efficiency of their performance (Sun and Tong, 2003; Wei 
et al., 2005; Fan et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008). To accommodate further economic 
development, China recognized the need to modernize its capital market by abolishing this split 
share structure across listed firms. 
After a previously unsuccessful attempt in 2001 (e.g., Kim et al., 2003) to reform the split 
share structure, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced on 29
th
 April 
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2005 its decision to mandate the elimination of the trading constraints imposed on all restricted 
shares. Two groups of firms were chosen for an initial piloting of the scheme, on 9
th
 May and 
19
th
 June 2005, respectively, and on 4
th
 September 2005 official guidelines were issued, 
providing formal operational procedures. To avoid the sharp price drop in the stock market that 
had occurred with previous such attempts, the government required the release of trading 
constraints to be gradual, and a compensation deal to be agreed by and paid out to existing 
tradable shareholders. Firth et al. (2010) provide evidence that state-controlled listed firms 
offered more compensation to existing tradable shareholders than other firms, probably due to 
government pressure aimed at ensuring the success of the reform. The stock exchange 
regulatory authority selected listed firms in batches to carry out the process. Once the 
negotiation process was complete and the compensation deal had been agreed, the portion of 
restricted shares offered as compensation to the minority private investors would become 
tradable at once. After a 12-month period following the ratification of the compensation deal, 
all restricted shares held by those shareholders holding less than 5% of the firm’s ownership 
could also be traded in the stock market. Within a further 12 (24) months, large shareholders 
holding more than 5% of the firm’s ownership would also be allowed to trade up to 5% (10%) 
of their restricted shares. Finally, all restricted shares would become fully tradable in the stock 
market, 36 months after the ratification of the compensation plan. Majority of the Chinese listed 
firms had their compensation payout plan ratified by the end of 2008. Thus, most of listed firms 
in China would not have any restricted shares remaining by the end of 2011.  
So, has the Split Share Structure Reform benefitted the Chinese listed firms and their 
minority shareholders? This is a crucial research question that deserves to be addressed given 
the significance of this reform to the development of the Chinese capital market. Our study 
seeks to answer this question by providing original empirical evidence of the economic 
consequences of this reform.   
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2.5 Hypothesis development 
We synthesize the aforementioned literature on the Chinese foreign share discount, 
ownership structure, and the Share Structure Reform, to generate our research hypotheses. The 
existing literature shows findings that are consistent with the foreign share discount being 
higher among firms with less liquidity, more information asymmetry, and greater monitoring 
costs. However, this evidence may only be associating the foreign share discount with the 
symptoms of some deeper underlying problems, one of which could be the split share structure 
of ownership in Chinese listed firms. Under the split share structure, the dominant shareholders 
of state-controlled Chinese listed firms mainly held restricted shares that could not be traded in 
the stock market as the shares held by private minority shareholders could. Therefore, despite 
their dominant position, state shareholders in such firms would have had little interest in the 
share return performance of the firms they controlled. This, in turn, would have led them to 
exercise less power and influence over managers to urge them to maximize the market value of 
their firms. In other words, under the split share structure, the accountability of state-controlled 
listed firms’ managers to the capital market would have been limited to private shareholders in 
minority positions. This conflict of interests between the dominant and minority shareholders 
under the split share structure would have reduced the effectiveness of corporate governance 
and exacerbated the agency problem. The joint existence of widespread state ownership and the 
split share structure created an institutional feature specific to China that would have facilitated 
insider expropriation. It is expected that this problem would have been greater among firms 
under state control and/or associated with more restricted shares. Foreign investors are known 
to be more concerned about insider expropriation, because they lack local knowledge and incur 
higher monitoring costs, than domestic investors (e.g., Leuz et al., 2009). Thus, they are likely 
to have demanded a higher return than domestic investors on firms with a greater scope for 
insider expropriation under the split share structure. Given these arguments, we hypothesize 
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that: 
H1: Prior to the Split Share Structure Reform, Chinese listed firms under state control or 
having a higher ratio of restricted to total shares would have been associated with a higher 
foreign share discount. 
As a result of the disadvantage for foreigners, institutional reform that could reduce the 
scope for insider expropriation should make more of a difference to foreign investors than 
domestic investors. For instance, Tan et al. (2011) show that the following and forecast 
accuracy of foreign analysts improves more than that of domestic analysts when corporate 
transparency improves. Since the monitoring costs of foreign investors are higher than those of 
their domestic counterparts, we also expect the Split Share Structure Reform to have had a 
greater impact on the valuation of Chinese listed firms by foreign investors than by domestic 
investors. To the extent that the incentive alignment effect invoked by this reform discourages 
insider expropriation, there will be a greater reduction in monitoring costs among the foreign 
investors than the domestic investors. This should in turn lead to a greater reduction in the 
required return among the former group of investors than the latter. Given this, we hypothesize 
that: 
H2: Following the Split Share Structure Reform, Chinese listed firms under state control or 
with a higher ratio of restricted to total shares will be associated with a greater decline in 
the foreign share discount. 
It is important to clarify that we are definitely not stipulating that the foreign share discount 
phenomenon was only and entirely driven by the split share structure of ownership among 
Chinese listed firms. The objective of our study is to determine whether the split share structure 
contributed significantly to foreign investors’ discounting of Chinese listed firms. There could 
be other unidentified factors in the Chinese institutional environment that continue to cause this 
discount even after the Split Share Structure Reform. For instance, the lack of alternative 
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investment channels for Chinese domestic investors, which reduces their required returns 
relative to those of foreign investors (Fernald and Rogers, 2002), may continue to cause the 
foreign share discount phenomenon among A- and B-share dual-listed firms. Thus, we do not 
expect that the reform will have completely eliminated the entire Chinese foreign share 
discount puzzle. The specific prediction of our hypothesis H2 is that there should be a 
significantly greater reduction in the foreign share discount among state-controlled listed firms 
than among privately-controlled listed firms, and among listed firms with more restricted 
shares in comparison to those with fewer restricted shares.  
Firms under state control or which have a higher proportion of restricted to total shares serve 
as the treatment group in our test of the impact of the reform, while those under private control 
or which have a lower proportion of restricted shares serve as our control group. If we observe 
a drop in the foreign share discount that is, however, not more significant among firms in the 
treatment group than among those in the control group, then we will not be able to infer that it is 
the Split Share Structure Reform that has brought about the decline. In turn, this would also 
weaken the inference that it is the poor corporate governance, caused by the possession of 
restricted shares by the dominant shareholders of state-controlled listed firms, that contributes 
to the foreign share discount in China. On the other hand, if we observe a significantly greater 
decline in the foreign share discount in the treatment than in the control group, then this would 
reduce the possibility that the drop is due to other unidentified background reasons, such as a 
time trend or business cycles. 
Around the period when the Split Share Structure Reform was implemented, there are two 
alternative effects that could influence our evidence. First, the financial crisis that began in late 
2007 could add noise to our analyses. However, this would be likely to affect the share prices of 
firms in both our treatment and our control group, simultaneously. In the case of flight to quality, 
foreign investors are more likely to ditch firms they deem less desirable, such as those in our 
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treatment group, with a higher perceived agency problem. Thus, if anything, the financial crisis 
should work against us finding results in favor of our predictions. Second, the Chinese 
convergence to the IFRS also overlaps with our post-reform period. If IFRS indeed strengthens 
Chinese listed firms’ accounting quality, then this may also reduce the firm-specific discount 
rate. However, Chinese listed firms that issue B-shares have long been reporting under both the 
original domestic accounting standard and IFRS. As a result, the IFRS convergence is not 
expected to influence the A- and B-share dual-listing Chinese firms in our sample.  
There are also two possible counterarguments against our hypothesis H2. The first critique is 
that, even after trading restrictions have been abolished, the state shareholders may still be 
unlikely to sell their shares due to government pressure. Thus, there may be no incentive 
alignment effect achieved through the reform at all. However, this critique neglects the 
established Chinese government policy known as “Zhua Da Fang Xiao”, which seeks to sustain 
ownership only in strategic enterprises (e.g., energy, transportation, aerospace, defense, etc.) 
and encourages the relaxation of control among less essential businesses.
2
 Anecdotal evidence 
from the media also shows that some previously restricted shares held by state shareholders 
have been traded in the stock market following this reform.
3
 Even if state shareholders do not 
race to trade their shares immediately once they are allowed to, this does not mean that they 
have no incentive to want to see an increase in their firms’ market performance. This is because 
they could be holding on to the shares in anticipation of the long-term growth of their firms’ 
market value. The second critique is that there is no incentive alignment effect until all of the 
restricted shares of a firm become fully tradable, in other words, 36 months after the ratification 
of the compensation plan in the reform process of each firm. According to this critique, it will 
only be possible to examine the impact of the reform across all firms in the Chinese stock 
market using a post-2011 sample. Thus, our study will not capture any incentive alignment 
effect associated with the reform. However, this critique is hinged on the narrow assumption 
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that all restricted shareholders are too myopic to prepare and plan ahead. The CSRC’s 
announcement in 2005 already made clear the government’s intention to proliferate the reform 
across all Chinese listed firms. Keen restricted shareholders would have stepped up their 
influence so as to increase their firms’ market value before their shares became eligible for 
trading, in order to maximize their profit when trading did become permitted. It takes time to 
identify profitable investment projects and boost the market value of a firm, so it is unlikely that 
the restricted shareholders would have waited until the day their shares became tradable to 
begin such efforts. Section 2.4 mentioned that restricted shareholders were able to sell all or a 
portion of their holdings within the 36-month horizon, depending on the proportion of the firm 
they owned. Thus, this critique also completely ignores the wealth implications of a rising share 
price for the restricted shareholders over this period.  
3. Sample and methodology 
3.1 Test of hypotheses 
To test our predictions in hypotheses H1 and H2, we use regression analyses based on the 
equation below:  
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   (1) 
The dependent variable FSDi,t is the foreign share discount of firm i at the end of month t, 
calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. Based on 
this construction, a higher FSDi,t value indicates a greater foreign share discount. We use two 
key variables to test our hypotheses. TREATi,t is assigned the value 1 for firms in our treatment 
group and 0 otherwise. POSTi,t equals to 1 from the year in which the compensation payout plan 
of the reform was ratified for the firm in question and for all years afterwards, and to 0 for the 
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years before this. Firms are allocated to the treatment (control) group if they are state- 
(privately-) controlled or have above (below) the yearly cross-sectional median level of the 
ratio of restricted to total shares. These two different ways of identifying the firms in our 
treatment group serve as a mutual robustness check to increase the rigor of our findings. We 
define the post-reform period for each firm as starting from the year when the restricted 
shareholders completed their compensation negotiations with the freely tradable shareholders 
and commenced the process of eliminating the restricted shares. Although not all restricted 
shares were immediately rendered tradable, the price should be forward-looking and we expect 
that the foreign investors’ perceived risk toward these firms should have already started to 
change once the abolishment of all restricted shares became imminent. The interaction term 
TREATi,t POSTi,t enables us to test the incremental effect of the reform on the foreign share 
discount among the firms in our treatment group. If the coefficient 1 > 0, this will indicate a 
greater foreign share discount in the treatment group than in the control group before the reform, 
which will confirm our hypothesis H1. If the coefficient 3 < 0, this will indicate a greater 
reduction of the foreign share discount in the treatment group than in the control group after the 
reform, which will confirm our hypothesis H2.  
We include four sets of control variables. The first set addresses the information asymmetry 
(e.g., Chan et al., 2008), market liquidity (Chen et al., 2001), and investor speculation (Mei et 
al., 2009) explanations put forward in the literature to address the Chinese foreign share 
discount. RMVi,t-1 is the ratio of the market capitalization of A-shares to B-shares at the end of 
the previous month. Information asymmetry is expected to be greater among firms with a lower 
A-share market capitalization, since such firms are smaller. RTOi,t-1 is the ratio of the turnover 
of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. Liquidity is assumed to be higher among 
firms with higher turnover. RRETi,t-1 is the ratio of the stock returns of A- to B-shares in the last 
month. Speculation is likely to be greater in stocks with higher past returns. This variable also 
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controls for the relative price movement between A- and B-shares of the same firm. These three 
control variables are based on data available from the stock market and so we can update them 
on a monthly basis as we can for the dependent variable. 
The second set of control variables includes determinants of the cost of equity capital. 
LEVi,t-1 is the debt-to-equity ratio of the last fiscal year, which captures financial risk. SALEi,t-1 
is the percentage change in sales growth in the last fiscal year, which serves as a proxy for 
demand-side growth. IROAi,t-1 is the industry median-adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal 
year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets; this measure captures the 
profitability of the firm. TQi,t-1 is the Tobin’s Q in the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of 
market value and debt, divided by total equity, which captures firm performance. BETAi,t-1 
captures systematic risk exposure and is measured as CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, 
estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market 
excess returns over the past one-year period. PIi,t-1 is the percentage change in share price 
informativeness over the last year and serves as a proxy for changes in the firm-specific 
information environment. The share price informativeness measure is calculated as the log of 
[(1–R2)/R2] where R2 is the goodness-of-fit measure based on a time-series regression of 
firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess 
returns, following Fernandes and Ferreira (2008).
4
 The construction of these control variables 
either requires data available from the financial statements (e.g., leverage, sales, profitability, 
and Tobin’s Q) or estimation through past historical return data (e.g., beta and price 
informativeness). Thus, we update them on an annual frequency, based on the previous fiscal 
year-end values. 
The third set of control variables includes corporate governance qualities, which not only 
affect the cost of equity capital (e.g., Lombardo and Pagano, 2002) but has also been used to 
explain the Chinese foreign share discount (Tong and Yu, 2011). OWNCi,t-1 is the ownership 
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concentration of the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index based on the ownership 
held by the ten largest shareholders of the firm. CHOLDi,t-1 is equal to 1 for firms with CEO 
shareholdings above top 75
th
 or below bottom 25
th
 percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 
otherwise. Low CEO ownership reduces the incentive alignment with the shareholders while 
high CEO ownership induces entrenchment. Thus, both effects increase the agency problem. 
CDUALi,t-1 is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 
otherwise. CEOs that also serve as the chairman of the board have the power to reduce the 
effectiveness of the board’s monitoring of them. BINDPi,t-1 is 1 for firms whose proportion of 
independent directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 
otherwise. Independent shareholders are assumed to have a greater incentive and greater 
expertise to monitor managers. BMEETi,t-1 is 1 for firms with number of board meetings in the 
last fiscal year above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. More frequent board 
meetings indicate more active monitoring by the board. BSIZEi,t-1 is 1 for firms with board size 
in the last fiscal year above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. The corporate 
governance control variables are also updated annually, and based on the previous fiscal 
year-end values. 
Finally, we also include three sets of dummy variables that control for industry (Industry), 
year (Year), and regional (Area) fixed effects, respectively. This is because state ownership, 
corporate governance, and foreign investor preferences may vary over time across different 
industries, and because of disparities in regional development. We define industry according to 
the first two digits of the GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) code. We define 
region based on Firth et al. (2006), who group firms into four different regions based on 
economic development level. We define industry according to the first two digits of the GICS 
(Global Industry Classification Standard) code. We define region based on Firth et al. (2006), 
who group firms into four different regions based on economic development level. To further 
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ensure the robustness of our results, we also replicate our analyses by controlling for firm fixed 
effects and by bootstrapped median regression.   
3.2 Sample description, summary statistics, and correlation matrix 
Our sample period covers 2001 to 2008. We choose to begin our analyses after the opening 
of the B-share market to Chinese domestic investors in 2001, to ensure consistency between the 
pre- and post-reform periods. From the Chinese Security Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) and China Center of Economic Research (CCER) databases, we obtain the data used 
to compute variables such as the foreign share discount, state control status, the proportion of 
restricted shares, the firm-specific year of reform, market capitalization, turnover, stock returns, 
debt-to-equity ratio, the return on assets ratio, Tobin’s Q, share price informativeness, 
ownership concentration, CEO ownership, CEO duality, the number of outside directors, the 
number of board meetings, board size, and industrial and regional classifications. We obtain 
Chinese domestic market returns from Datastream and the U.S. stock market returns from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). To deal with outliers, we winsorize the top and 
bottom 1% of all our regression variables, except those that are constructed as dummy variables. 
We include all listed firms that issue both A- and B-shares in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges. We exclude firms that were listed on the stock exchanges after the reform was 
launched at the end of 2005, as they did not adopt a split share structure. Finally, our sample 
requires all of the aforementioned variables to have valid values and includes a total of 5,870 
firm-month observations. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analyses. Over our 
sample period of 2001 to 2008, the median monthly B-share discount is 45.04%. The median 
ratios of the monthly turnover (RTO) and share returns (RRET) of the A- to B-shares of the 
same firms are 1.2947 and 0.7427 respectively. Since RTO > 1, this confirms that the B-shares 
are less actively traded than their A-share counterparts. Since RRET < 1, this indicates that the 
 23 
B-shares are associated with higher past returns than the A-shares, which suggests that foreign 
investors require higher returns than Chinese domestic investors. The A- and B-share 
dual-listing firms in our sample have an average sales growth (SALE) of 30.57% and above 
industry median profitability (IROA). Turning to the correlation matrix in Table 2, notice that 
this discount is negatively correlated with RMV, which indicates a lower foreign share discount 
among higher A-share market capitalization firms, since information asymmetry tends to be 
lower in larger firms. The discount is positively correlated with RTO, which indicates a higher 
foreign share discount among B-share stocks with lower turnover, which are supposed to have 
less liquidity. Foreign investors also attach a lower discount to Chinese listed firms that are 
more profitable (IROA). They also demand higher returns from firms with higher growth in 
sales (SALE), greater systematic risk exposure (BETA) and greater concentration of ownership 
(OWNC). Firms with larger boards (BSIZE) have lower discounts, possibly because such firms 
have boards that are more active or have more expertise with which to supervise their firms.  
[insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1 Treatment group based on state-controlled firms 
Table 3 presents our tests of hypotheses H1 and H2 using state-controlled listed firms as the 
treatment group and privately-controlled listed firms as the control group. Notice that the four 
regressions consistently yield significantly positive coefficients for TREAT. This indicates that, 
prior to the Split Share Structure Reform, the state-controlled listed firms did indeed have 
higher foreign share discounts than the privately-controlled firms. This confirms the prediction 
in our hypothesis H1 and implies that foreign investors do indeed attach a higher discount rate to 
state-controlled Chinese listed firms, possibly due to corporate governance concerns. To this 
extent, our findings are also broadly consistent with Tong and Yu (2011), who document a 
higher B-share discount among Chinese listed firms with weaker governance, despite using an 
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earlier sample period of 1998 to 2005 and not testing the difference between state- and 
privately-controlled firms as we do. Our findings confirm that the combination of being 
state-controlled and having a split share structure contributed to the Chinese B-share discount. 
Turning to hypothesis H2, notice throughout Table 3 that the coefficients pertaining to the 
interaction term TREATPOST are all significantly negative. This indicates that the 
state-controlled firms in our treatment group experienced a significantly greater reduction in 
their foreign share discount after the reform, than the privately-controlled firms in our control 
group. Although the negative coefficients of POST indicate that the control group also 
experienced a reduction, it was significantly less than for the treatment group. 
Privately-controlled firms may have experienced a reduction for two reasons. First, it could be 
the result of a background time trend, unrelated to the reform. Second, such firms may also have 
received corporate governance benefits from the reform, since they may also have had state 
shareholders and restricted shares. However, the effect is thought to be less since the conflict of 
interests between dominant and minority shareholders caused by the split share structure would 
have been less severe. The coefficients of TREATPOST confirm the predictions of our 
hypothesis H2. They also suggest that the benefit of the reform has economic significance. 
This finding has two key implications. First, the Split Share Structure Reform has indeed 
reduced the foreign share discount, since we observe a greater impact on Chinese 
state-controlled listed firms that would have been more sensitive to its effects. We provide 
original evidence that this major change in the institutional settings of the Chinese stock market 
has yielded favorable economic consequences. To be specific, we show that this reform could 
have reduced the costs of Chinese state-controlled firms’ acquisition of foreign equity capital. 
Second, the split share structure did indeed contribute to the foreign share discount among 
Chinese state-controlled listed firms, because we see a significant decline after the reform. To 
be specific, foreign investors’ discount of Chinese state-controlled listed firms was significantly 
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driven by the higher perceived risk associated with the scope for insider expropriation under the 
split share structure.  
Our findings are robust to the controls of the determinants of the Chinese foreign share 
discount established in the literature, as well as factors that are likely to influence equity 
investors’ required returns. Control variables that are consistently significant across all four 
regressions in Table 3 have robust relationships with the foreign share discount. The 
coefficients of RTO are significantly positive, which indicates that foreign investors set higher 
discounts for stocks that are less liquid in the B-share market, which is consistent with Chen et 
al. (2001). The required returns of foreign investors are higher for firms with higher growth 
(SALE), and lower for firms with above industry median profitability (IROA). These findings 
are all pro-intuitive. Our findings are also robust to controls of industry, year, regional, and firm 
fixed effects, as well as to bootstrapped median regression. 
[insert Table 3 here] 
4.2 Treatment group based on above median level of restricted to total shares ratio 
Table 4 presents our tests of hypotheses H1 and H2 using firms with above (below) median 
level of restricted to total shares ratio as our treatment (control) group. Across all four 
regressions, the coefficients of TREAT are significantly positive. This indicates that firms with a 
higher proportion of restricted shares, which make up our treatment group, were associated 
with a higher foreign share discount before the Split Share Structure Reform was enacted. This 
finding is in line with the prediction in our hypothesis H1 and suggests that foreign investors 
indeed required a higher rate of returns from Chinese listed firms with more ownership 
maintained through restricted shares, which was likely to exacerbate the conflict of interests 
between shareholders and impede the effectiveness of the corporate governance role of 
ownership. This finding serves as a mutual robustness check of our evidence in Table 3, which 
uses state-controlled firms as the treatment group. In fact, using the ratio of restricted to total 
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shares gives us an even more direct measure with which to capture the impact of the split share 
structure on the foreign share discount. Thus, we provide direct evidence that the split share 
structure contributes to the foreign share discount in China.  
In terms of hypothesis H2, the coefficients pertaining to the interaction term TREATPOST 
are significantly negative throughout Table 4. This indicates that the firms with more restricted 
shares, in our treatment group, are associated with a significantly greater decline in the B-share 
discount after the Split Share Structure Reform, than the firms with fewer restricted shares, in 
our control group. Although the control group also experienced a reduction, as indicated by the 
negative coefficients of POST, the effect was significantly less than among the treatment group. 
As mentioned earlier, the control group may have experienced a foreign share discount 
reduction but this could be due to confounding effects unrelated to the reform. Alternatively, it 
may have been caused by the corporate governance benefits of the reform, since such firms did 
also have state shareholders and restricted shares. However, the effect would be expected to be 
weaker, since the impact of abolishing the restricted shares for such firms would have been less 
than for those in the treatment group. Our prediction in hypothesis H2 is thus confirmed in Table 
4 by the coefficients of TREATPOST. This further strengthens the two key inferences we draw 
from Table 3, since our results are not affected by alternative definitions of the treatment group.  
[insert Table 4 here] 
4.3 Robustness checks  
Tables 5 and 6 present further robustness tests.
5
 In Table 5 we substitute the treatment group 
dummy variable in Equation 1 directly by state ownership ratio (SOR) in Panel A or restricted 
share ratio (RSR) in Panel B.
6
  Notice that the coefficients of SOR and RSR are significantly 
positive. This indicates that firms with higher state ownership ratio or higher restricted shares 
ratio are also associated with higher foreign share discount prior to the reform. The coefficients 
of SORPOST and RSRPOST are significantly negative. This indicates that the foreign share 
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discounts associated with such firms are incrementally lower after the reform. These results 
suggest that our main findings in Tables 3 and 4 are not specific only to the use of treatment 
group dummy variables in the regression analyses. In Table 6 we substitute foreign share 
discount (FSD) with A-share price minus B-share price following Chan et al. (2008). The 
treatment group is defined as state controlled firms in Panel A (as in Table 3) and above median 
level restricted share ratio firms in Panel B (as in Table 4). The coefficients of TREAT are 
consistently and significantly positive and the coefficients of TREATPOST are also 
consistently and significantly negative. These findings suggest that our main results in Tables 3 
and 4 are not sensitive to alternative definition of foreign share discount. 
[insert Tables 5 and 6 here] 
5. Conclusion 
China is a fast-growing and increasingly influential emerging economy. Studies of Chinese 
capital market issues are attracting increasing attention from academics, practitioners, and 
regulators. We intersect two important topics in this literature, namely, the reform of the split 
share structure (e.g. Firth et al., 2010; Cummings and Hou, 2012), and the foreign share 
discount puzzle (e.g. Chan et al., 2008). We provide original evidence addressing both topics, 
by confirming that the split share structure of ownership significantly contributed to the foreign 
share discount among Chinese listed firms under state control, and those with more restricted 
shares. Our analysis controls for alternative explanations put forward in the literature to explain 
the foreign share discount, such as liquidity, information asymmetry and governance qualities. 
Future studies could seek to identify other possible factors in the Chinese institutional 
environment that also contribute to the discounting of listed firms by foreign investors. For 
instance, if the lack of alternative investment channels for Chinese domestic investors also 
contributes (Fernald and Rogers, 2002), then researchers could attempt to validate this 
explanation following the enactment of relevant institutional reforms in the future. Another 
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possible extension of our study would be to evaluate the impact of the Split Share Structure 
Reform on firms that issue both A-shares traded in mainland China’s stock exchanges and 
H-shares traded in Hong Kong’s stock exchange. To avoid the influence of institutional 
differences between mainland China and Hong Kong, our study focuses only on firms that issue 
A- and B-shares, both of which are traded in mainland China’s stock exchanges. 
In terms of policy implications, we suggest that, through the maintenance of state control by 
holding restricted shares, the dominant shareholders were deprived of wealth gains from share 
price rises and therefore had fewer incentives to monitor managers and ensure they maximized 
their firms’ market value. In other words, the split share structure encouraged the entrenchment 
effect of state shareholders, and increased their incentive to collude with executives in the 
expropriation of the wealth of private investors. Since foreign investors lack local knowledge, 
they are more concerned about the scope for insider expropriation than domestic investors are. 
As a result of greater monitoring costs, foreign investors will also charge a higher required 
return than domestic investors for compensation. The elimination of trading constraints has 
made the wealth of dominant shareholders sensitive to share price movements in the market. 
This has improved the incentive alignment between state and private shareholders, which will 
in turn discourage insider expropriation. Due to the informational disadvantage for foreign 
investors, the reforms are expected to lower the monitoring costs and therefore the required 
returns of foreign investors, more than those of domestic investors. Thus, we provide empirical 
evidence that the Split Share Structure Reform, which is one of the most important changes to 
have been made to the institutional settings of the Chinese stock market, has been beneficial to 
minority investors and firms alike. The minority investors have benefited from better protection 
of their wealth, while firms have benefited from a reduction in the cost of equity capital from 
foreign investors. Both are likely to strengthen the efficiency of the Chinese stock market in 
allocating capital, which is crucial to the further sustained growth of the country’s economy.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 Mean 
Standard  
deviation 
25
th 
 percentile 
50
th 
 percentile 
75
th 
 percentile Obs. 
FSD 0.4378 0.1490 0.3438 0.4504 0.5486 5870 
SOR 0.3044 0.2123 0.1196 0.3140 0.4728 5870 
RSR 0.4561 0.1542 0.3602 0.4612 0.5777 5870 
POST 0.3247 0.4683 0 0 1 5870 
RMV 1.1052 0.0885 1.0365 1.1041 1.1701 5870 
RTO 1.3237 0.3057 1.1410 1.2947 1.4709 5870 
RRET 0.7356 6.4205 0.0581 0.7427 1.5021 5870 
LEV 0.4804 0.1701 0.3604 0.4916 0.6072 5870 
SALE 0.3057 1.2281 –0.0079 0.1475 0.3334 5870 
IROA 0.0021 0.0147 –0.0043 0.0014 0.0090 5870 
TQ 0.6845 0.1696 0.6278 0.7111 0.7752 5870 
BETA 1.0928 0.3198 0.8904 1.0927 1.2939 5870 
PI –0.6182 2.7197 –0.7800 –0.0114 0.4508 5870 
OWNC 0.1819 0.1233 0.0892 0.1423 0.2680 5870 
CHOLD 0.2874 0.4526 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 5870 
CDUAL 0.0240 0.1531 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 5870 
BINDP 0.1138 0.3176 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 5870 
BMEET 0.5588 0.4966 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 5870 
BSIZE 0.3543 0.4784 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 5870 
       
Note: This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analyses. The sample period covers 
2001-2008 and includes A- and B-share dual-listing stocks appearing in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. FSDi,t is the monthly foreign share discount, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, 
divided by the A-share price. SOR is state ownership ratio measured as yearly number of state shares divided by 
total number of shares. RSR is restricted shares ratio measured as yearly number of restricted shares divided by 
total number of shares. POST equals to 1 from the year in which the compensation payout plan of the reform was 
ratified for the firm in question and for all years afterwards, and to 0 for the years before this. RMV is the ratio of 
the market capitalization of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A- 
to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns of A- to B-shares at the end of 
the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the last fiscal year. SALE is the percentage change in sales 
growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, 
calculated as operating income divided by total assets. TQ is the Tobin’s Q for the last fiscal year, calculated as the 
sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, 
estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over 
the past one-year period. PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated 
as the log of [(1–R2)/R2] where R2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on 
both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is ownership concentration in the last fiscal 
year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. 
CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings above top 75th or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly 
cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as the board chairman in the last 
fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year 
was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms that held more board meetings in the 
last fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose board in the last fiscal 
year was larger than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 FSD SOR RSR REFORM RMV RTO RRET LEV SALE IROA TQ BETA PI OWNC CHOLD CDUAL BINDP BMEET BSIZE 
FSD 1                   
SOR 0.2209* 1                  
RSR 0.2484* 0.5685* 1                 
POST -0.1517* -0.0814* -0.3237* 1                
RMV -0.0885* 0.0038 -0.0235 0.0259 1               
RTO 0.1127* 0.0126 0.0031 0.0848* –0.019 1              
RRET -0.0102 -0.0175 -0.0032 0.0450* –0.0168 0.0348* 1             
LEV 0.0375* 0.0034 -0.1129* 0.1551* 0.1586* 0.0990* 0.0157 1            
SALE 0.0534* 0.0298 0.0309 0.0148 0.0013 –0.0469* –0.0025 0.0911* 1           
IROA -0.2370* -0.0996* -0.0537* 0.0872* –0.2134* –0.0664* 0.0129 –0.3255* 0.1098* 1          
TQ 0.0767* 0.1731* 0.2774* –0.1817* 0.0300 0.0498* 0.0114 0.3867* –0.0207 –0.1744* 1         
BETA 0.1106* 0.0643* -0.0171 0.0602* –0.0052 0.1813* 0.0141 0.2410* –0.1192* –0.3196* 0.0498* 1        
PI -0.0131 0.0348* 0.0987* –0.1024* 0.0533* –0.0423* –0.0179 0.0490* 0.0119 –0.0181 0.0696* –0.0800* 1       
OWNC 0.2391* 0.7054* 0.7470* –0.0641* –0.1004* 0.0201 –0.0006 –0.0780* –0.017 –0.0116 0.1942* 0.0184 0.0649* 1      
CHOLD -0.1484* -0.3720* -0.4795* 0.1489* –0.0916* –0.0189 0.0129 0.0106 –0.0545* 0.1741* –0.1927* –0.0779* –0.0964* –0.4309* 1     
CDUAL 0.0233 -0.012 -0.0945* 0.0213 –0.0983* –0.0063 0.0061 0.1103* 0.005 –0.0683* 0.0340* 0.0549* 0.0078 –0.0802* 0.0767* 1    
BINDP 0.0269 0.0640* 0.0933* –0.1526* –0.0613* 0.0211 0.0088 0.0247 –0.0166 0.0249 0.0693* –0.0037 0.0398* 0.0356* –0.0315* 0.0171 1   
BMEET 0.0439* 0.0164 0.0499* 0.0126 0.0912* 0.0645* –0.0139 0.1096* 0.0356* –0.0245 –0.0354* 0.1185* –0.0116 –0.0574* –0.0803* 0.0410* –0.0164 1  
BSIZE -0.1368* -0.0205 -0.0609* –0.0934* 0.0003 –0.1017* 0.0109 0.0323* –0.0117 0.0830* 0.0585* –0.1053* –0.0258 –0.1509* 0.0360* 0.0233 0.2581* –0.0164 1 
                    
Note: This table presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in our analyses. The sample period covers 2001-2008 and includes  A- and B-share dual-listing stocks appearing on both the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges. FSDi,t is the monthly foreign share discount, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. SOR is state ownership ratio measured as 
yearly number of state shares divided by total number of shares. RSR is restricted shares ratio measured as yearly number of restricted shares divided by total number of shares. POST equals to 1 from the 
year in which the compensation payout plan of the reform was ratified for the firm in question and for all years afterwards, and to 0 for the years before this. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of 
A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns on A- to B-shares at the end of the 
previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio in the last fiscal year. SALE is the percentage change in the sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in 
the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. TQ is Tobin’s Q of the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM 
beta up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. PI is the percentage change in 
share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as the log of [(1–R2)/R2] where R2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. 
weekly market excess returns. OWNC is ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. CHOLD 
is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings above top 75th or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as board chairman in 
the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms 
which held more board meetings in the last fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose boards in the last fiscal year were larger than the cross-sectional median, 
and 0 otherwise. * denotes 1% level significance. 
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Table 3. Regression analyses using state-controlled firms as treatment group 
  Regression 1  Regression 2  Regression 3  Regression 4   
Intercept 0.4732 (16.91) 
*** 
0.6660 (22.31) 
*** 
-0.250
6 
(-1.17) 
 
0.8122 (15.65) 
*** 
TREAT 0.0658 (8.53) 
*** 
0.0484 (6.49) 
*** 
0.0458 (2.46) 
** 
0.0364 (3.95) 
*** 
POST 0.0319 (2.90) 
*** 
-0.0572 (-4.15) 
*** 
-0.075
1 
(-3.06) 
*** 
-0.0852 (-5.94) 
*** 
TREATPOST -0.0956 (-8.28) 
*** 
-0.0781 (-7.45) 
*** 
-0.054
1 
(-2.35) 
** 
-0.0892 (-9.63) 
*** 
RMV -0.1748 (-8.05) 
*** 
-0.3171 (-14.79) 
*** 
0.4602 (2.59) 
** 
-0.3280 (-9.43) 
*** 
RTO 0.0552 (6.69) 
*** 
0.0490 (5.45) 
*** 
0.0996 (10.02) 
*** 
0.0764 (8.49) 
*** 
RRET -0.0001 (-0.43) 
 
-0.0001 (-0.58) 
 
0.0003 (1.44) 
 
-0.0001 (-0.35) 
 
LEV 0.0084 (0.62) 
 
-0.0251 (-2.04) 
** 
-0.010
7 
(-0.20) 
 
-0.0441 (-2.88) 
*** 
SALE 0.0111 (8.10) 
*** 
0.0113 (9.16) 
*** 
0.0051 (1.97) 
* 
0.0116 (6.83) 
*** 
IROA -2.2846 (-14.29) 
*** 
-2.0571 (-13.83) 
*** 
-1.155
2 
(-4.12) 
*** 
-2.2733 (-10.5) 
*** 
TQ -0.0322 (-2.50) 
** 
0.0298 (2.73) 
*** 
0.0000 (0.00) 
 
0.0220 (1.55) 
 
BETA 0.0150 (2.39) 
** 
0.0329 (5.28) 
*** 
0.0195 (1.30) 
 
0.0397 (4.53) 
*** 
PI -0.0024 (-3.55) 
*** 
-0.0006 (-1.04) 
 
-0.001
7 
(-1.68) 
* 
-0.0008 (-1.20) 
 
OWNC 0.2387 (14.68) 
*** 
0.2104 (13.28) 
*** 
0.0784 (0.84) 
 
0.2317 (15.37) 
*** 
CHOLD -0.0023 (-0.49) 
 
0.0036 (0.87) 
 
-0.010
9 
(-1.04) 
 
0.0031 (0.51) 
 
CDUAL 0.0406 (3.29) 
*** 
0.0303 (2.62) 
*** 
0.0144 (0.53) 
 
0.0266 (1.94) 
* 
BINDP 0.0048 (0.82) 
 
0.0237 (4.17) 
*** 
0.0068 (0.67) 
 
0.0149 (3.14) 
*** 
BMEET 0.0162 (4.49) 
*** 
0.0215 (6.47) 
*** 
0.0009 (0.11) 
 
0.0194 (6.14) 
*** 
BSIZE -0.0226 (-5.56) 
*** 
-0.0087 (-2.30) 
** 
0.0000 (0.00) 
 
-0.0072 (-1.42) 
 
             
Industry effect No   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year effect No   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Region effect No   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Firm fixed effect No   No   Yes   No   
BSQREG No   No   No   Yes   
Adjusted R
2
 0.1881   0.3487   0.0772      
Pseudo R
2
          0.2367   
Observation 5870   5870   5870   5870   
             
Note: This table presents our main regression analyses. The sample period covers 2001-2008 and includes A- and B-share 
dual-listing stocks appearing in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. The dependent variable FSD is the monthly 
foreign share discount, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. TREAT is set to 1 for 
state-controlled firms, and 0 otherwise. POST equals to 1 from the year in which the compensation payout plan of the reform was 
ratified for the firm in question and for all years afterwards, and to 0 for the years before this. RMV is the ratio of the market 
capitalization of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A- to B-shares at the end of the 
previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns on A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity 
ratio in the last fiscal year. SALE is the percentage change in the sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median 
adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. TQ is Tobin’s Q of the last 
fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last 
year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past 
one-year period. PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as the log of [(1–R2)/R2] 
where R2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly 
market excess returns. OWNC is ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based on the 
ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings above top 75th or 
below bottom 25th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as board 
chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal 
year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms which held more board meetings in the last fiscal 
year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose boards in the last fiscal year were larger than the 
cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Regression 1 (2) excludes (includes) the controls 
for industry, year, and regional fixed-effects. Regression 3 (4) applies firm fixed-effect control (bootstrapped median regression). 
Regressions 1 to 3 report the adjusted R2 and t-statistics, adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Regression 4 reports the pseudo R2. *, **, and 
*** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance.  
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Table 4. Regression analyses using firms with above median level of restricted to total shares ratio as 
treatment group 
  Regression 1  Regression 2  Regression 3  Regression 4   
Intercept 0.5699 (19.2) 
*** 
0.7282 (23.51) 
*** 
-0.1952 (-0.86) 
 
0.8415 (17.91) 
*** 
TREAT 0.0717 (12.54) 
*** 
0.0635 (11.67) 
*** 
0.0720 (4.16) 
*** 
0.0554 (8.24) 
*** 
POST -0.0343 (-6.64) 
*** 
-0.0963 (-9.09) 
*** 
-0.0999 (-6.19) 
*** 
-0.1224 (-13.49) 
*** 
TREATPOST -0.0741 (-8.76) 
*** 
-0.0907 (-12.10) 
*** 
-0.0771 (-4.57) 
*** 
-0.0846 (-12.94) 
*** 
RMV -0.1933 (-8.70) 
*** 
-0.3292 (-15.13) 
*** 
0.4702 (2.51) 
** 
-0.3351 (-11.52) 
*** 
RTO 0.0478 (5.40) 
*** 
0.0451 (4.76) 
*** 
0.0979 (9.04) 
*** 
0.0689 (10.21) 
*** 
RRET 0.0000 (-0.17) 
 
-0.0001 (-0.35) 
 
0.0004 (1.90) 
 
-0.0001 (-0.46) 
 
LEV 0.0085 (0.62) 
 
-0.0214 (-1.76) 
* 
-0.0079 (-0.14) 
 
-0.0300 (-2.51) 
** 
SALE 0.0116 (9.50) 
*** 
0.0111 (10.10) 
*** 
0.0060 (3.03) 
*** 
0.0114 (12.54) 
*** 
IROA -2.3154 (-14.55) 
*** 
-2.0019 (-13.61) 
*** 
-1.1906 (-4.29) 
*** 
-2.1502 (-9.98) 
*** 
TQ -0.0511 (-3.96) 
*** 
0.0133 (1.31) 
 
-0.0086 (-0.36) 
 
0.0183 (1.33) 
 
BETA 0.0170 (2.72) 
*** 
0.0308 (5.02) 
*** 
0.0229 (1.65) 
 
0.0365 (4.92) 
*** 
PI -0.0028 (-4.13) 
*** 
-0.0007 (-1.27) 
 
-0.0018 (-1.59) 
 
-0.0010 (-1.63) 
 
OWNC 0.1716 (8.97) 
*** 
0.1595 (8.83) 
*** 
0.0342 (0.42) 
 
0.1513 (8.31) 
*** 
CHOLD -0.0044 (-0.94) 
 
-0.0001 (-0.03) 
 
-0.0166 (-1.58) 
 
-0.0001 (-0.04) 
 
CDUAL 0.0379 (2.92) 
*** 
0.0260 (2.14) 
** 
0.0117 (0.42) 
 
0.0187 (1.02) 
 
BINDP 0.0067 (1.18) 
 
0.0268 (4.88) 
*** 
0.0079 (0.81) 
 
0.0216 (4.01) 
*** 
BMEET 0.0136 (3.72) 
*** 
0.0190 (5.71) 
*** 
0.0033 (0.42) 
 
0.0143 (3.54) 
*** 
BSIZE -0.0219 (-5.43) 
*** 
-0.0099 (-2.65) 
*** 
0.0011 (0.09) 
 
-0.0127 (-2.80) 
*** 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Industry effect No   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year effect No   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Region effect No   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Firm fixed effect No   No   Yes   No   
BSQREG No   No   No   Yes   
Adjusted R
2
 0.1909   0.3584   0.1034      
Pseudo R
2
          0.2432   
Observation 5870   5870   5870   5870    
             
Note: This table presents our main regression analyses. The sample period covers 2001-2008 and includes A- and B-share dual-listing 
stocks appearing in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. The dependent variable FSD is the monthly foreign share 
discount, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. TREAT is set to 1 for firms whose ratio 
of restricted to total shares is above the yearly cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. POST equals to 1 from the year in which the 
compensation payout plan of the reform was ratified for the firm in question and for all years afterwards, and to 0 for the years before 
this. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of 
A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns on A- to B-shares at the end of the previous 
month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio in the last fiscal year. SALE is the percentage change in the sales growth over the last fiscal 
year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. 
TQ is Tobin’s Q of the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta 
up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess 
returns over the past one-year period. PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as the 
log of [(1–R2)/R2] where R2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and 
U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based 
on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings above top 
75th or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as board 
chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year 
was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms which held more board meetings in the last fiscal year 
than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose boards in the last fiscal year were larger than the 
cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Regression 1 (2) excludes (includes) the controls 
for industry, year, and regional fixed effects. Regression 3 (4) applies firm fixed-effect control (bootstrapped median regression). 
Regressions 1 to 3 report adjusted R2 and t-statistics, adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Regression 4 reports pseudo R2. *, **, and *** 
denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance. 
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Table 5. Robustness tests substituting treatment group dummy by state ownership ratio or restricted share ratio 
 Panel A: State Ownership Ratio  Panel B: Restricted Share Ratio  
  Regression 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Regression 2 
 
 Regression 1  Regression 2   
Intercept 0.7297 (23.36) 
*** 
0.8418 (20.17) 
*** 
0.6387 (20.87) 
*** 
0.8418 (26.58) 
*** 
SOR 0.1197 (10.21) 
*** 
0.1062 (9.65) 
*** 
  
 
  
 
POST -0.0841 (-7.17) 
*** 
-0.1032 (-8.84) 
*** 
  
 
  
 
SORPOST -0.1301 (-7.78) 
*** 
-0.1647 (-8.55) 
*** 
  
 
  
 
RSR   
 
  
 
0.3427 (14.73) 
*** 
0.1062 (7.22) 
*** 
POST   
 
  
 
0.0271 (1.83) 
* 
-0.1032 (-6.25) 
*** 
RSRPOST   
 
  
 
-0.3214 (-13.53) 
*** 
-0.1647 (-9.09) 
*** 
RMV -0.3496 (-15.86) 
*** 
-0.3478 (-14.12) 
*** 
-0.3317 (-15.60) 
*** 
-0.3478 (-15.75) 
*** 
RTO 0.0438 (4.54) 
*** 
0.0689 (8.43) 
*** 
0.0392 (4.03) 
*** 
0.0689 (6.65) 
*** 
RRET -0.0001 (-0.37) 
 
-0.0003 (-1.10) 
 
-0.0001 (-0.46) 
 
-0.0003 (-0.90) 
 
LEV -0.0405 (-3.30) 
*** 
-0.0579 (-3.78) 
*** 
-0.0087 (-0.73) 
 
-0.0579 (-4.09) 
*** 
SALE 0.0109 (9.17) 
*** 
0.0111 (6.12) 
*** 
0.0096 (7.99) 
*** 
0.0111 (6.38) 
*** 
IROA -2.0746 (-13.76) 
*** 
-2.1558 (-12.18) 
*** 
-1.9875 (-13.66) 
*** 
-2.1558 (-12.34) 
*** 
TQ 0.0339 (3.20) 
*** 
0.0330 (2.92) 
*** 
-0.0009 (-0.09) 
 
0.0330 (2.26) 
** 
BETA 0.0344 (5.52) 
*** 
0.0452 (4.43) 
*** 
0.0327 (5.26) 
*** 
0.0452 (4.37) 
*** 
PI -0.0004 (-0.69) 
 
-0.0008 (-0.90) 
 
-0.0011 (-1.80) 
* 
-0.0008 (-0.83) 
 
OWNC 0.1179 (5.72) 
*** 
0.1473 (7.10) 
*** 
0.0433 (2.02) 
** 
0.1473 (7.23) 
*** 
CHOLD 0.0043 (1.06) 
 
0.0023 (0.40) 
 
0.0068 (1.65) 
 
0.0023 (0.45) 
 
CDUAL 0.0165 (1.38) 
 
0.0045 (0.21) 
 
0.0278 (2.22) 
** 
0.0045 (0.36) 
 
BINDP 0.0282 (5.07) 
*** 
0.0244 (3.76) 
*** 
0.0232 (4.28) 
*** 
0.0244 (3.63) 
*** 
BMEET 0.0207 (6.15) 
*** 
0.0172 (4.78) 
*** 
0.0202 (6.10) 
*** 
0.0172 (4.14) 
*** 
BSIZE -0.0129 (-3.43) 
*** 
-0.0117 (-2.71) 
*** 
-0.0109 (-2.95) 
*** 
-0.0117 (-2.11) 
** 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Industry effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Region effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
BSQREG No   Yes   No   Yes   
Adjusted R
2
 0.3521      0.3705      
Pseudo R
2
    0.2407      0.2407   
Observation 5870   5870   5870   5870    
             
Note: This table presents robustness tests. The sample period covers 2001-2008 and includes A- and B-share dual-listing stocks 
appearing in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. The dependent variable FSD is the monthly foreign share discount, 
calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. SOR is state ownership ratio measured as yearly 
number of state shares divided by total number of shares. RSR is restricted shares ratio measured as yearly number of restricted shares 
divided by total number of shares. POST equals to 1 from the year in which the compensation payout plan of the reform was ratified for 
the firm in question and for all years afterwards, and to 0 for the years before this. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of A- to 
B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RRET is 
the ratio of the stock returns on A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio in the last fiscal year. 
SALE is the percentage change in the sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in 
the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. TQ is Tobin’s Q of the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum 
of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series 
regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. PI is the percentage 
change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as the log of [(1–R2)/R2] where R2 is based on a time-series 
regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is 
ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest 
shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings above top 75th or below bottom 25th percentile of 
yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 
otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, 
and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms which held more board meetings in the last fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 
otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose boards in the last fiscal year were larger than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. All 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Regression 2 is based on bootstrapped median regression and reports pseudo R2. *, **, and *** 
denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance. 
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Table 6. Robustness tests using alternative definition of foreign share discount  
 Panel A: TREAT = state controlled firms  Panel B: TREAT = above median level  
restricted share ratio firms 
 
  Regression 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Regression 2 
 
 Regression 3  Regression 4   
Intercept 10.2984 (18.02) 
*** 
8.1471 (13.22) 
*** 
11.2017 (19.62) 
*** 
8.5468 (13.11) 
*** 
TREAT 0.4549 (4.67) 
*** 
0.2068 (2.91) 
*** 
1.0632 (8.93) 
*** 
0.7724 (6.61) 
*** 
POST 0.2461 (1.08) 
 
-0.4731 (-2.70) 
*** 
-0.6362 (-3.99) 
*** 
-0.7588 (-6.79) 
*** 
RATIOPOST -1.4668 (-7.06) 
*** 
-0.5827 (-5.17) 
*** 
-1.1270 (-5.61) 
*** 
-0.9692 (-4.82) 
*** 
RMV -3.5319 (-8.95) 
*** 
-4.0941 (-13.68) 
*** 
-3.6806 (-9.50) 
*** 
-4.1938 (-11.37) 
*** 
RTO 0.5064 (3.85) 
*** 
0.6474 (3.97) 
*** 
0.4724 (3.61) 
*** 
0.6308 (5.02) 
*** 
RRET -0.0024 (-0.53) 
 
-0.0047 (-1.01) 
 
-0.0010 (-0.23) 
 
-0.0044 (-0.96) 
 
LEV -0.0148 (-0.06) 
 
0.0551 (0.19) 
 
0.0502 (0.20) 
 
0.2667 (0.93) 
 
SALE 0.1702 (4.04) 
*** 
0.1999 (3.33) 
*** 
0.1627 (4.06) 
*** 
0.1857 (2.97) 
*** 
IROA 28.1039 (9.88) 
*** 
15.8847 (8.73) 
*** 
29.5816 (9.95) 
*** 
15.6022 (5.63) 
*** 
TQ 0.5165 (1.75) 
* 
0.8265 (2.75) 
*** 
0.2760 (0.94) 
 
0.3100 (0.65) 
 
BETA -1.1913 (-8.50) 
*** 
-0.7941 (-6.15) 
*** 
-1.2086 (-8.60) 
*** 
-0.7518 (-6.61) 
*** 
PI 0.0112 (0.94) 
 
0.0020 (0.13) 
 
0.0080 (0.69) 
 
-0.0016 (-0.10) 
 
OWNC 3.9105 (10.97) 
*** 
3.9458 (13.67) 
*** 
2.5411 (6.69) 
*** 
2.9233 (6.97) 
*** 
CHOLD 0.5063 (6.14) 
*** 
0.5658 (9.27) 
*** 
0.4823 (5.87) 
*** 
0.5329 (5.06) 
*** 
CDUAL -0.1239 (-0.77) 
 
-0.3345 (-1.62) 
 
-0.1883 (-1.12) 
 
-0.3935 (-2.39) 
** 
BINDP 0.9051 (6.84) 
*** 
0.4386 (3.19) 
*** 
0.9297 (6.77) 
*** 
0.4807 (5.50) 
*** 
BMEET 0.2310 (3.31) 
*** 
0.0665 (1.43) 
 
0.1724 (2.51) 
** 
0.1202 (1.26) 
 
BSIZE 0.1281 (1.55) 
 
-0.1807 (-2.07) 
** 
0.0839 (1.04) 
 
-0.1800 (-2.72) 
** 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Industry effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Region effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
BSQREG No   Yes   No   Yes   
Adjusted R
2
 0.4016      0.4040      
Pseudo R
2
    0.2629      0.2671   
Observation 5870   5870   5870   5870    
             
Note: This table presents robustness tests. The sample period covers 2001-2008 and includes A- and B-share dual-listing stocks 
appearing in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. The dependent variable is foreign share discount calculated as A-share 
price minus B-share price following Chan et al. (2008). In Panel A, TREAT is 1 for state controlled firms, and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, 
TREAT is 1 for firms with above yearly cross-sectional median restricted to total share ratio, and 0 otherwise. POST equals to 1 from 
the year in which the compensation payout plan of the reform was ratified for the firm in question and for all years afterwards, and to 
0 for the years before this. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the 
ratio of the turnover of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns on A- to B-shares at the 
end of the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio in the last fiscal year. SALE is the percentage change in the sales growth 
over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income 
divided by total assets. TQ is Tobin’s Q of the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. 
BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on 
daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last 
year, calculated as the log of [(1–R2)/R2] where R2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both 
Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the 
Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO 
shareholdings above top 75th or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose 
CEO also served as board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent 
directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms which held more board 
meetings in the last fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose boards in the last fiscal 
year were larger than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Regression 2 is based on 
bootstrapped median regression and reports pseudo R2. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance. 
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1 See details at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a_84o9PPPGqk.  
 
2  For instance, this policy was mentioned in the Ninth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development and the Outline for the Long-Range Objective Through the Year 2010. 
 
3
 We list a few recent financial news articles here, translating their Chinese language headlines into English, and 
provide their web URLs for reference: 
 “29 firms this year experienced local government stock ownership reduction” 
http://finance.ifeng.com/stock/zqyw/20110827/4474686.shtml  
 “Selling shares – July wave of government stock ownership reduction” 
http://stock.hexun.com/2011-07-29/131890710.html 
 “July’s local government stock ownership reduction in 25 listed firms to cash in 3.3 billion RMB” 
http://www.beelink.com/20110808/2808514.html 
 
4 Chinese domestic market returns are based on the Shanghai Composite Index. Chinese risk-free rates are based 
on the 7-day interbank rate. U.S. stock market returns are based on a NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
value-weighted portfolio. U.S. risk-free rates are based on the one-month Treasury bill. 
 
5 We thank the referees for suggesting these robustness tests. 
 
6 Following referee’s suggestion, we also replicated our analyses by redefining TREAT as 1 for firms with a ratio 
of restricted to total shares above the 80th percentile and 0 otherwise. We obtained similar findings in support of 
the predictions of both hypotheses. 
